WHY WE SHOULD TAKE THE BALL AND RUN WITH IT

It’s no secret that I am a supporter of a Tasmanian football club and the Macquarie Point stadium.

However my support comes with a dose of realism, acknowledging that in life we rarely have a prefect process or set of conditions to allow us to achieve what could be a wonderful outcome.

The stadium has become a divisive issue, and let’s be honest, it was always going to be.

The State Government have been very poor in explaining how and why certain decisions have been made around the stadium.

They have not engaged well with the community on where the project is at, nor have they fully explained the benefits.

The latest episode in this is the release of the Gruen report. For the record I have not met Mr Gruen and have no relationship with him.

Mr Gruen states Tasmania deserves an AFL team – but the stadium is too heavy a price to pay and the deal should be renegotiated.

Well Tasmania has deserved a team now for 30 years and where has that got us?

The AFL is a ruthless organisation, they make hard nosed business decisions, if we want a team we need to get their agreement.

Mr Gruen seems oblivious to the internal politics at play between the AFL Executive and the all-powerful Commission heavily influenced by the club Presidents.

The Gruen report recommends delaying a new stadium for five to seven years despite Macquarie Point Development Corporation documents revealing each year the build is delayed, $80m is added to the cost.

Mr Gruen is right to cite concerns about budget, but can anyone name an infrastructure project that has not been under costed in Australia in the last 30 years?

Impacts on state budget are real, agreed. But in this matter we do not have the luxury of time.

The opportunity is now. If we lose it, we will not only lose our club but also the massive economic uplift that the facility will bring.

Mr Gruen uses a range of methods to come up with his $1.4 bn cost estimate, a figure covering a 30 year period. I question some of these methods.

These include the government’s $91m Devils subsidy as a stadium cost. This would have to be paid no matter whether a stadium was built.

It then follows that the AFL’s $360m contribution to the club should be counted as a stadium benefit. But it is not.

Mr Gruen has come to the position that the stadium is in the wrong place, ignoring the reality that successful stadiums in Australia are in CBDs.

I agree the process was inadequate but that does not necessarily follow that it’s the wrong site, it’s not an ideal site but it’s the only one we have.

Mr Gruen refers to the Regatta point stadium as a possibility without even acknowledging the similar type of public investment required and makes no mention of the many environmental challenges facing that proposal, challenges clearly outlined by planning expert Brian Risby in a recent Opinion piece in this paper.

The report also omits the stadium’s 1500 seat function centre from is calculations - I find this puzzling to say the least.

The function centre will be more than double the size of the city’s current largest venue.

It’s hard to overstate the transformative impact this will have on the state’s economy.

This aspect of the project is to me one of the most compelling arguments for the stadium yet no one seems to know about it.

Mr Gruen compares Mac Point with Rod Laver arena but fails to recognise the market within which it competes. Rod Laver arena has competition in the Melbourne market, the Mac Point development will not, it will stand alone.

Mr Gruen quotes crowd figures to justify his pessimistic position citing the poor crowds when Nth Melb played Carlton in Hobart in 2018/2019, but conveniently ignores when Carlton played in Launceston against Hawthorn in 2016 and 2019 the crowd numbers were 18k and 15k respectively. These numbers reflect the low supporter base of the Kangaroos and mirror their challenges in Melbourne.

Mr Gruen decides that a Tasmania v Collingwood match at the new stadium will not draw higher interstate visitation than a North Melbourne v Gold Coast match at Bellerive. Seriously?

He also ignores the massive potential of ex-pat Tasmanians (40k+ foundation members in Victoria alone) coming ‘home’ to watch their team.

The report does not consider revenues generated from stadium naming rights, conservatively priced at $5m a year ($150m over 30 years). This may be included as part of the $5m “other revenues” but naming rights alone will be at least $5m a year based on Optus Stadium which signed a 10 year deal for $50m in 2017.

Mr Gruen estimates the cost of moving the goods shed at $18m, despite the MPDC estimating the cost to be 6m and the Gruen appointed quantity surveyor estimating it would be $7m. He bases $18m on “conversations” he’s had with other people.

Mr Gruen dismisses the potential economic development around the stadium, citing a US report about US stadiums. No consideration of Australian stadium models and no acknowledgment that this facility will be a massive increase in our capacity, unlike in the US where stadiums are privately owned and are in established markets with comparable and competing venues. How many hotels have been built in Hobart since the opening of MONA?

I will make my last reflection on the Gruen report by returning to the start: The report’s startling claim Tasmania can’t afford a stadium because we have too many social and economic problems.

As a local MP I see the team and the stadium as a way to address some of these challenges.

Give young people and their families in working class areas something to dream about, something to believe in, a reason to stay and for those that have left a reason to come home.

Finally, I do not buy into the argument that funding major infrastructure such as a stadium must come at the expense of essential public services like hospitals and housing.

Good governments can and should do both.

MANAGERS, DIRECTORS WERE PAID TO ENSURE FERRY AND PORTS SERVICES OPERATED WELL – AND WE WERE LET DOWN

The Spirits fiasco has been a collective failure that demands the removal of responsible boards and reform of GBEs, says David O’Byrne.

The delayed, over-budget Spirit of Tasmania ferries and the non-existent Devonport berth upgrades will cost Tasmanians close to $100m directly and will cost our state’s economy over half a billion dollars of economic activity.

The mismanagement of these projects has led to the departure of TT-Line’s chief executive and chairman, and ultimately cost Michael Ferguson his job. But out of this debacle, we are now presented with a unique opportunity for reform – an opportunity for serious reform of government business enterprises, many of which have not been acting in the best interests of Tasmania for quite some time.

When I wrote to the Premier on Sunday about my loss of confidence in Minister Michael Ferguson over this matter, I also made it clear the mismanagement of the Spirits project and the Devonport berth upgrades were collective failures involving two of our biggest government business enterprises GBE). I called on the Premier to act on the incompetence and intransigence of the TT-Line and TasPorts.

I believe the board and senior management of both businesses should be removed from their positions immediately, with interim administrators appointed pending a review of governance and structure. Managers and board directors at TasPorts and TT-Line are paid handsomely to ensure the ferry services and port infrastructure essential to an island state are kept on track.

This has not happened in the case of the Spirits fiasco. Even worse, some GBEs have thumbed their nose to being held accountable to their true shareholders, the Tasmanian people.

Journalists have remarked that getting media comment from some GBEs is at times like trying to draw blood from a stone. During parliamentary GBE scrutiny – which happens too little, too late – some senior managers and directors have made an art form out of not answering questions. Therefore the current leadership of TT-Line and TasPorts should be replaced. Minister Michael Ferguson and the former chair of TT-Line should not be the only casualties of this sorry tale.

Further to this, I am seeking an immediate review of the legislation that governs state-owned companies and GBEs with a view to create sweeping reforms of those institutions to ensure they are compelled to act and make decisions in the best interests of Tasmania, and Tasmanians – not just their own sandpit.

To understand why GBEs behave the way they do, we have to understand how they started. They are a halfway house arising from the major restructure of government activities during the 1990s under the umbrella of national competition policy.

These large organisations, formerly government departments, are at “arm’s length” from government, with ministers acting as shareholders. Increasingly over the years GBEs have become more corporate, more businesslike, and further away from their primary purpose to provide essential services to Tasmania in freight, transport, energy, and so on.

The Premier has said in state parliament this week he wants GBEs to again put the interests of Tasmania first. But as recent history shows, this has clearly not been happening. There have been multiple examples of GBEs performing poorly or outright behaving badly. Metro Tasmania is yet to replace nearly 900 weekly bus services slashed more than a year ago and they seem to be in constant dispute with their employees over wages, conditions amid plummeting morale.

TasNetworks’ approach to recent wage negotiations was some of the worst behaviour I have seen by any company towards workers during an EBA process. The chief executive sought to circumvent negotiations by unions representing underpaid electrical workers with a $6000 cash incentive – an incentive that no one asked for – for all employees. It is estimated this will cost the Tasmanian taxpayer $5.5m, without going anywhere near fixing the very real issue of pay parity for a section of their workforce. A vote was then forced by management while field workers were still reconnecting power after the recent storms.

When it comes to TasPorts, in addition to the non-existent Spirit berthing facility, the company jeopardised Tasmania’s status as the Antarctic gateway, been accused of price gouging by ports users and has a worsening relationship with many customers.

So whether it’s bungled major projects, failing public services, unfair treatment of workers, outrageous golden handshakes or an allergy to public scrutiny – there are problems with GBEs as far as the eye can see. This is a collapse of oversight and governance, and a few stern words and a couple of political scalps simply won’t fix it.

Under pressure from myself and others in state parliament and during recent budget estimates scrutiny, the Premier has finally acknowledged many GBEs are not acting in Tasmania’s best interests

The question is, will he now act?

The University needs to stop the politicking and focus on rebuilding the confidence of staff and community

Both sides of the moving debate have been guilty of dubious claims and we sorely need some clarity, writes David O'Byrne.

The University of Tasmania is one of our biggest public assets and is central to the state's economic, cultural and social life. With annual revenues of $750m, 30,000 students and 3000 staff, it directly and indirectly accounts for as much as 5 per cent of Tasmania's GSP, and trains much of the state's professional labour force.

The university consistently places in the top dozen or so universities by competitive research income ($120m in 2022), and in the top half of the university sector for PhD graduates (1336 in 2022) and underpins much of the innovation and research capacity of Tasmania's economy.

The university's act of parliament establishes its public character but also enshrines its autonomy a universally recognised cornerstone of university governance to ensure it remains free from political interference. But its autonomy can never be absolute, and its decisions should be the subject of informed public debate and scrutiny.

Unfortunately, the public debate about the university's proposed move to the Hobart CBD is mired in policy and political spin from all sides. Data and arguments are routinely cherrypicked making sober assessment of the issues difficult for observers and specialists alike. Good, and perhaps compelling, arguments for the move have been lost amid a welter of inflated claims and counter-claims.

The university overstates the educational access benefits of a CBD location. Poor participation rates for working class people in Hobart's suburbs and regions are linked to low secondary school completion rates and inadequate student income support.

The short journey from the CBD to Sandy Bay is of little consequence the university's own relocation modelling suggests a net gain of only 700 enrolments over 25 years. And it hypes a housing development at the Sandy Bay site as part of a solution to the shortage of affordable housing in Hobart.

While this development may help ease the university's financial pressures, it will make, at best, a marginal contribution to "solving" the housing crisis, particularly as the price of the houses will be beyond the means of most first homebuyers.

Opponents of the CBD move understate the costs of redeveloping the Sandy Bay site and ignore the potential financial returns from the sale, or long-term lease, of some or all of the Sandy Bay site.

And while there is legitimate concern about aspects of the university's shift to online learning, less face-to-face teaching and a reduction in course offerings, opponents conflate these changes with the CBD move.

Retention of some or all of the Sandy Bay site will not reverse this shift, much of which is a response to changing student preferences (particularly to combine work and study).

The ongoing controversy is a huge distraction from the university's core teaching and research work. Its community standing has been eroded by the massive rejection of the CBD move in the 2022 Hobart electors' poll and according to a recent university survey of its own staff only 40 per cent have confidence in the senior leadership.

These outcomes reflect repeated missteps by the university and a critical failure in its governance and risk management processes. The university has destabilised itself.

This destabilisation is now compounded by a Liberal opportunistic backflip which calls for any sale of university property at the Sandy Bay campus to be approved by both houses of parliament.

This is serious overreach. Where other state jurisdictions impose limitations on the sale and disposal of university property, they typically involve ministerial authority, and none of them impose a requirement for parliamentary approval.

While the politicking and spin around the CBD move occupies centre stage, the real issue is a serious decline in Tasmanian student enrolments. Between 2018 and 2022, the university's domestic student load fell by 5.6 per cent compared with an Australia-wide fall of 1.6 per cent; and Tasmanian student enrolments fell by 1440 (or 9.7 per cent).

Mainland student enrolments at the university grew by 970 (or 7.1 per cent) while the number of Tasmanians enrolling at mainland universities grew by 530 (or 10.4 per cent).

This reflects a disturbing longer-term trend. In 2010, only 18 per cent of Tasmanian students were enrolled at mainland universities compared with 30 per cent in 2022. The state's brightest students are leaving in ever-larger numbers.

And in 2022, the university enrolled fewer Tasmanians than it did in 2010. Over this period Tasmanian enrolments fell by 1540 (or 10.3 per cent) while mainland enrolments increased by 11,740 (or 501 per cent).

Remarkably, the university enrolled more mainlanders than Tasmanians in 2022. This points to the need to refocus attention on lifting Tasmania's higher education participation rate.

Improved secondary school retention, more scholarships, better bridging and remediation programs, and enhanced regional outreach are part of this mix.

The university must reset (again) with a focus on rebuilding community and staff confidence.

And the University Council needs to find the courage to set clearer policy and accountability benchmarks for the vice chancellor and senior management.

Defenders of genuine university autonomy should expect nothing less.

Like so many people my family, friends and I were caught up in the traffic chaos on Monday. It was frustrating for us personally but for many people there were serious consequences and my thoughts and best wishes goes out to all those impacted.

Anyone who tried to drive anywhere around the city on that afternoon or evening experienced the sort of city-wide gridlock that would send a shiver down the spine of even the most dedicated Sydneysider.

While these events are thankfully a rare occurrence, it demonstrates just how brittle the Hobart road and transport network is and how susceptible it is to disruption. It is difficult to imagine how much worse it could have been – just think what would have happened if this occurred during the school term.

Hobart city is jammed between a river and a mountain, but although these natural features make our city beautiful and unique it creates challenges for smooth movement of commuters, freight and travelers alike. We know many of us that live in Clarence, Glenorchy or Kingborough either work, play or have friends and family in other southern council areas and have little choice but to travel through Hobart city to get to where we need to be.

Much of the traffic entering or crossing the city is funneled into a combination of the Macquarie/Davey Street couplet, the Brooker Highway, the Southern Outlet and the Tasman Bridge. For those trying to get from East to West, or North to South and vice versa, there’s often only one route you can take.

One incident on any one of those roads then the entire system grinds to a crawl, and occasionally, like on Monday, it comes to a complete stop.

The consequences of intense traffic congestion for our lives, community and the economy are profound. In 2016 the then Liberal State Infrastructure Minister, Rene Hidding, convened a crisis summit on the issue of traffic congestion in Hobart. If it was a crisis then, I am not sure what it is today.

There is no single solution to resolve this issue, but with Hobart’s population expected to grow substantially over the next decade we need to see a comprehensive, layered approach to the problem.

There is no question that we need to significantly increase investment in our public transport network, including buses, ferries and light rail. We also need to increase the use of bikes and walking options for those coming to and from the city, but the reality is that these measures will only suit a portion of the travelling public.

The last major infrastructure improvement that resulted in improvements for Hobart traffic occurred in 2012/13 with the creation of the Brighton transport Hub, which removed the freight rail depot out of the Evans Street Wharf district and moved thousands of daily light and heavy freight truck movements out of the Hobart CBD.

I have long argued that we need to push ahead and create a functioning ring road system for our city. These ideas are not new, but we simply need to agree they are required and get on with building them.

The first is a Flagstaff Gully Link Road that connects Mornington with Bowen Bridge (and upgrades to the East Derwent Highway north of Risdon Vale). This will better connect the Bowen Bridge with the Eastern Shore, giving commuters a viable alternative route when the Tasman Bridge is congested. It will also ease traffic pressures on the East Derwent and Tasman Highways.

The first part of this link road is actually already built, completing the rest of the link road and connecting it to the East Derwent Highway between Risdon Vale and Geilston Bay is only logical. This link road will divert significant freight transport away from the Tasman Bridge.

The second key road upgrade that is needed is a ‘pressure valve’ link road that connects the Southern Outlet near Tolmans’ Hill down through McRobies road gully and connecting with the Northern Suburbs. This would take significant pressure off Macquarie and Davey Streets and the Brooker Highway, allowing traffic to bypass the city and providing an alternative route for Southern Outlet traffic. It would also serve to better connect Hobart’s southern and northern suburbs. The number of locations where this link road connects could be added to over time to disperse traffic across the network and avoid the creation of other choke points.

The State Government need to consider building a small number of short tunnels, overpasses and underpasses to alleviate key pressure points in our road network. To put it simply, there is no more space on our roads and the only way to accommodate more traffic would be to divert it over or under existing roads.

Examples of where these pieces of infrastructure could work include the junction of Davey Street and the Southern Outlet, which would remove the criss-crossing of Northbound and Southbound traffic and remove the massive choke point that this intersection creates. There’s also the potential grade-separation of the Railway (or “ABC”) Roundabout, which was just one of the many suggestions within the landmark 2016 report on Greater Hobart Congestion that this State Government have not followed through on.

We must keep in mind that these large infrastructure projects take years to build, and so if the State Government don’t start working on fixing Hobart’s traffic congestion right away, then we can only expect the situation to worsen over the next few years.

What we need is a transport strategy, including infrastructure upgrades, that not only manages the current demand but will also meet projected growth. A fifth lane on the outlet, an extra ferry or two and a continuation of the under resourcing of Metro will simply not cut it.

GBE SCRUTINY HEARINGS MISSING THEIR MARK AS TANGO TURNS INTO PREDICTABLE TASSIE TWO-STEP

The annual circus of parliament's government business enterprises estimates hearings concluded at the end of last month.

Tasmania's GBEs are large organisations, formerly government departments or newly state-owned companies established to be "arm's-length" from government, but with ministers acting as shareholders.

It's a halfway house arising from the major restructure of government activities during the 1990s under the umbrella of "national competition policy".

One consequence of this hybrid status is that the GBEs are not subject to serious public scrutiny or genuine public accountability. In theory, government ministers who hold the portfolio relevant to each GBE are accountable and responsible for its operations. They provide each company with shareholder expectations of what the government of the day feels the key priorities should be. Aside from an annual report tabled in parliament, and the document outlining the minister's shareholder expectations, the actions of these GBEs are largely hidden from public view.

And ministers are able to hide behind the corporate status of GBEs to avoid responsibility for difficult policy decisions in public good areas such as electricity, water, public transport and Bass Strait ferries.

The veil of "commercial in confidence" obscures any public view of important GBE decisions and processes, despite the fact that these companies are subject to right-toinformation requests like other government departments.

This problem is highlighted by the inadequacies of annual parliamentary scrutiny of GBEs.

Each year GBEs and state-owned companies front either the lower or upper house estimates committees on a rotating basis to have their annual report and activities for the year scrutinised. But these hearings are theatrical rather than purposeful.

The time allowed ranges from one hour to three as a maximum. Lengthy introductions from the minister and board, and government backbenchers asking Dorothy Dix questions, leave little time for genuine scrutiny of complex issues. It encourages "gotcha" questions and usually yields little other than very mundane details.

It's a tango between government ministers desperate to avoid a controversy and the opposition, crossbenchers and upper-house independents, who are all desperate for a knockout punch or a headline to hang their hat on.

The GBEs are often desperate to avoid dancing in the aforementioned tango, which is why they are often less than forthcoming during the hearings. It's a pattern repeated every year. Last month's hearings provided a precious opportunity for MPs to ask questions about the operation of these businesses, but many questions were batted away as being "a matter

for the board", and these boards ultimately face little democratic scrutiny.

Sadly, it's more of a predictable Tassie two-step than a tango and nobody wins a prize, especially not the Tasmanian people.

Hydro Tasmania, one of the biggest companies in the state, is making billions of dollars' worth of decisions that will significantly impact current and future generations of Tasmanians. But it is only for three hours, each second year, that members from either house of parliament can scrutinise these decisions.

And the hearings are held in the first week of December, after parliament has risen for the year meaning that there are three months' hiatus where ministers can avoid follow-up questions in the parliament.

Sometimes important information bubbles to the surface, but usually only because it is required to be publicly reported.

This is why we know that former Hydro chief executive Albertini Evangelista was paid out $475,000, despite only being appointed to the role a few months earlier. And that in 2021 Hydro also paid out $965,000 to the chief operating officer, $542,000 to the chief strategy officer, $669,000 to the previous chief executive and $207,000 to the chief people officer as part of a major executive restructure triggered by the shortlived chief executive. This is waste on a grand scale.

It is not just Hydro, of course. I'm not sure what was in the water in 2018, but the TasNetworks general manager of works and services delivery was paid out a redundancy payout of almost $400,000. I assume that the company still needed somebody to do that job, so the question is why the redundancy was needed in the first place. This person bobbed up again a matter of weeks later, having been employed in a similar role by the biggest contractor to TasNetworks.

Back in 2018, TT-Line awarded a $761,000 termination payout and decided to give this individual a company car for a reason that was neither clear nor defensible.

This year, the outgoing TasPorts chief financial officer received a $303,000 termination payout.

This is all taxpayers' money. While the individuals concerned may be legally entitled to the payments, serious questions need to be answered. Why do the boards and ministerial shareholders of the GBEs allow such remuneration policies and practices? How can such continuing turnover and instability in senior executive ranks be defended?

We set up Tasmania for failure if we believe that the lack of transparency, the lack of accountability and the Punch-andJudy Show environment of GBEs is acceptable. Is the required transparency and accountability demanded of these public institutions being achieved?

Perhaps there are even more important questions about whether the market-based structure and culture of the GBEs remains fit for purpose. Have the GBEs become captured by an excessive commercial culture at the expense of the public interest? Are there better ways to deliver public goods in key infrastructure areas? The parliament needs a robust discussion on Tasmania's future options.

One thing is for certain the current GBE scrutiny hearings do not serve us well, and as a first step we must reform them.

We need robust and extended parliamentary scrutiny of GBE management and culture. The public good demands nothing less.

SHORT-STAY DISTORTS THE RENTAL MARKET

To ease the housing crisis, the state government needs to intervene in the rental market - and set new price signals for investors which would in turn increase affordable supply, writes David O’Byrne.

Tasmania’s rental market continues to be at crisis point. Statewide rents have jumped 45 per cent over the past five years, and the market is the tightest in the country with a chronic lack of social and private-market rental properties. In April, Hobart had a tiny rental vacancy rate of 0.4 per cent – with just 136 vacant rental properties – a vacancy rate four times lower than Sydney, and nearly five times lower than Melbourne.

Insufficient affordable rental supply is not new, and is part of (limited) private market failure in the housing sector. The state government needs to intervene in the market and set new price signals for private investors and increase affordable supply.

Since 2014, Liberal governments have failed to produce an integrated policy. They have trumpeted billion dollar-plus investments in new affordable social housing supply but have delivered just a tiny fraction of their targets. Only 1250 new social houses have been built since 2015, an average of 180 per year. Meeting the 2032 target of 10,000 now requires 875 new builds per year or nearly five times the current output rate.

Meanwhile the number of struggling Tasmanian families unable to afford the private rental market continues to rise. With no immediate access to public or social housing, their situation is dire. Social housing waiting lists have ballooned from 2900 in 2016 to more than 4300 families today, with average wait times now exceeding 72 weeks. That could be 72 weeks in a tent, in a car, or on a couch. And the number of applicants on the register who are successfully housed has fallen from over 900 per year in 2015 to only 800 in 2021. Homelessness strips people of dignity, and is a key driver of wider social problems including mental health and substance abuse issues, and intergenerational inequality.

I have previously argued for the re-establishment of the Tasmanian Housing Commission as a key mechanism to ensure the timely construction of increased state-funded non-market (public) housing supply. But this needs to be supplemented by measures to improve the efficiency of the private market in delivering affordable rental properties.

As well as increasing the public housing stock, government policy should deal with the role short stay accommodation (such as Airbnb) has played in reducing private market rental supply. In this market segment the state government can create incentives for investors to release properties for use as rental accommodation.

The number of listed short-stay properties has nearly doubled since 2017 with 5300 Tasmanian homes now on short-stay accommodation platforms. More than half of these are not primary residences. In the greater Hobart area the share of the private rental market represented by short-stay is nearly seven times that of Sydney and nearly five times that of Melbourne. The gap between returns to investors offering short-stay accommodation and the yields available through offering the same properties as rental accommodation is distorting the market.

This market failure has prompted suggested policy responses such as placing a cap on the number of properties which can be offered in the future as short-stay accommodation and/or increasing council rates on such properties. But these approaches would create inequities and distortions in the market by not treating all investors and owners equally. A future cap gives a big market advantage to existing short-stay accommodation providers, while increasing council rates is a flat tax which takes no account of the wide income differences between bigger and smaller investors in a short-stay market that is becoming increasingly concentrated.

A fairer and more efficient approach is to introduce a simple short-stay state government levy (perhaps called a rental market equalisation levy), calculated as a percentage of the total booking fee and applied automatically at checkout, on all short-stay accommodation booking sites, such as Airbnb. It would apply only to non-primary residences.

This policy has several advantages.

First, applied at an appropriate rate such a levy would reduce the gap between returns on short-stay and rental accommodation. This would provide some incentive for current short-stay investors to move properties back into the rental market, and for current rental accommodation investors to remain in that market. And it would treat all investors equally.

Second, it is simple and easy to administer. Short-stay booking platforms already have the required infrastructure to collect levies – more than $5bn globally is already collected by Airbnb – so there are no extra administrative burdens for owners or short-stay renters.

Third, the income generated by the scheme would be dedicated to homeless services and crisis accommodation. Owners and investors would know that they are making a social contribution while still yielding a significant return on their investment.

Fourth, many investors will still choose to focus on the short-stay tourist market but there would be a more level playing field balancing the interests of other investors, tourists and long-term renters.

This market equalisation levy can be targeted to individual local government areas, and the size of the levy can be modelled using a variety of economic scenarios. The short-term aim should be to encourage at least 500 current short-stay properties to return to the private rental market, and to maintain a better balance between short-stay and long term private rental in the longer term.

This modest but important reform needs to work in tandem with bigger policy measures, including re-establishing a State Housing Commission.